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INTRODUCTION 
The internet has become an integral part of how Americans conduct 
their daily lives.  Today, approximately nine of every ten American adults 
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use the internet to some extent,1 and that trend appears to have remained on 
the rise since the introduction of the world wide web on August 6, 1991.2  
While the list of uses for this technology can seem as expansive as its user 
base, there are several activities that are most popular with the American 
people.  Among these popular activities is, some would say unsurprisingly, 
shopping.3  
 The rise of internet retail sales, also known as e-commerce, may be 
a natural response to advancing technologies, but it also heralds a decline in 
more traditional forms of retail.  Specifically, physical storefronts, also 
known as brick-and-mortar stores, have seen a decrease in traffic, which has 
negative implications for sales tax revenue and the states that rely on it.4  As 
traditional retail locations close their doors, tax revenue growth slows.5  In 
order to combat these declining growth rates, states have begun seeking 
alternatives to limit their dependence on the physical storefront.  E-
commerce is one such alternative, which has the potential to bolster states’ 
tax revenue without running afoul of constitutional or market protections on 
internet retail sales.  However, taxing e-commerce raises a number of 
complications—most notably, how far states may extend their taxing 
authority to retailers who are not, either physically or functionally, contained 
within the territorial bounds of the state.  If states reach too far, they risk 
running afoul of constitutional protections to interstate commerce and 
hampering the very industry they seek to access.  If they do not reach far 
enough, states risk continued declines in sales tax revenue, upon which they 
heavily rely.  Ultimately, states must strive to strike a balance that captures 
the benefits of e-commerce taxation while respecting the bounds of their own 
authority and the needs of the industry. 
In support of this conclusion, this note begins in Section I by 
examining the shift toward e-commerce and its impact on state tax revenue.  
Next, Section II explores internet retail jurisprudence and the inception and 
dominion of the physical presence requirement.  As of June 21, 2018, 
however, that requirement has been laid to rest, and Section III addresses the 
                                               
 1. Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.
pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/. 
 2. Nick Carbone, Not So High-Tech Anymore: The First Website Ever Celebrates Its 
20th Birthday, TIME (Aug. 6, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/08/06/the-first-website-
ever-celebrates-its-20th-birthday/. 
 3. Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Online Shopping and E-Commerce, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/12/19/online-shopping-
and-e-commerce/. 
 4. See Alana Semuels, All the Ways Retail’s Decline Could Hurt American Towns, THE 
ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/05/retail-sal
es-tax-revenue/527697/. 
 5. Id. 
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outcome and effects of South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.6  Section IV describes 
the approaches states are currently taking to e-commerce taxation and 
considers whether those approaches may continue to be valid under the new 
rule.  Finally, noting still-unresolved issues in e-commerce taxation, Section 
V offers a model provision for imposing sales and use tax on internet retail 
that would respect continuing constitutional protections while still allowing 
states to take full advantage of a rapidly-growing revenue source. 
I. THE RISE OF INTERNET RETAIL AND THE CURRENT SALES AND 
USE TAXATION SYSTEM 
Nearly 80% of adults in the United States are online shoppers as of 
2016, which marks a considerable jump from the roughly 22% of American 
adults who reported making online purchases in 2000.7  Additionally, over 
half of those who reported making online purchases make at least several 
purchases per month, and a majority of Americans will not buy from stores 
without checking prices online first.8  There are many theories that purport 
to explain this growth: the convenience of online retail,9 for example, or 
consumers’ desire to compare and review products before purchasing.10 
Whatever the cause, the fact remains that internet retail sales are on 
the rise.  To illustrate this point, e-commerce sales in the first quarter of 2007 
accounted for only 3.2% of total retail sales in the United States, or $31.5 
billion.11  By contrast, in the first quarter of 2017, e-commerce sales were 
$105.7 billion, or 8.5% of total retail sales.12  That ten-year period saw a 
significant leap in the productivity of online retail; the percentage of e-
commerce sales in the market more than doubled, and the total value of e-
                                               
 6. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
 7. Smith & Anderson, supra note 3. 
 8. “Roughly one-in-five (21%) [adults in the U.S.] say they would buy from stores 
without checking prices online[.]” Id. 
 9. Seventy-two percent of weekly online shoppers value the ability to buy online 
without making a trip to the store. Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, Online shopping and 
purchasing preferences, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2
016/12/19/online-shopping-and-purchasing-preferences/. 
 10. “Americans take a number of factors into consideration when shopping for 
something that they haven’t purchased in the past – especially the ability to compare prices 
from multiple sellers and to ask questions about what they are buying.” Id. “Better selection” 
has also been identified as a leading reason that shoppers choose online retail. Barbara Thau, 
New Study Reveals Why Consumers Really Shop Online (Surprise: It Isn’t Low Prices), 
FORBES (Oct. 8, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/barbarathau/2013/10/08/why-
consumers-really-shop-online/#34b702b3c17a. 
 11. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES 1ST QUARTER 
2007 (2007), https://www.census.gov/mrts/www/data/pdf/07Q1.pdf. 
 12. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE SALES 1ST QUARTER 
2017 (2017), https://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/ecomm/17q1.pdf. 
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commerce sales more than tripled.13  These macro-scale trends can be seen 
at a micro level as well.  For example, North American sales for the well-
known online retailer Amazon saw a 400% increase between 2010 and 2016, 
rocketing from $16 billion to $80 billion.14  This growth has culminated in 
an estimated $123.7 billion spent on e-commerce in the first quarter of 
2018.15 
While this trend is good news for the e-commerce market, its impact 
on traditional retail may not be so positive.  Brick-and-mortar stores have 
seen continuing declines in traffic “[a]cross just about every sector and 
virtually every time period.”16  Despite numerous positive markers for the 
retail economy—wage growth is on a post-recession high even in America’s 
lower- and middle-class families,17  GDP is on the rise, and overall retail 
spending is up18—many brick-and-mortar stores are struggling to stay 
afloat.19  Nine physical-store retailers filed for bankruptcy within the first 
three months of 2017, placing 2017 on track to have the highest rate of 
Chapter 11 filings for physical-store retailers since the Great Recession of 
2008.20  Large retail chains like J.C. Penney and Macy’s have announced 
hundreds of store closures, and mall visits dropped 50% from 2010 to 2013 
and have continued to fall each year thereafter.21  As online retailers expand, 
                                               
 13. For a more in-depth look at the progression of e-commerce sales, the United States 
Census Bureau provides a “Time Series” of e-commerce reports that charts the total and e-
commerce sales (adjusted quarterly for seasonal variations, but not for price changes) of each 
fiscal quarter, issuing from the fourth quarter of 1999 onward. See Monthly & Annual Retail 
Trade, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 29, 2017), https://www.census.gov/retail/index.html#eco
mmerce (follow the “Adjusted Sales” hyperlink by the Time Series). 
 14. Derek Thompson, What in the World is Causing the Retail Meltdown of 2017?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/04/retail-me
ltdown-of-2017/522384/. 
 15. In all, e-commerce accounted for nearly one-tenth of total sales in the United States 
during the first quarter of 2018. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE 
SALES 1ST QUARTER 2018 (2018), https://www2.census.gov/retail/releases/historical/ecomm/
18q1.pdf. 
 16. Steve Dennis, What if Retail Traffic Declines Last Forever?, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2017, 
10:47 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevendennis/2017/02/16/what-if-retail-traffic-
declines-last-forever/#667101d962c0. 
 17. Derek Thompson, The Most Underrated Story about the U.S. Economy, THE 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/03/wages-
rising/519114/. 
 18. Thompson, supra note 14. 
 19. See Krystina Gustafson, Retail Bankruptcies March Toward Post-Recession High, 
CNBC (Mar. 31, 2017, 6:54 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/31/retail-bankruptcies-ma
rch-toward-post-recession-high.html. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Thompson, supra note 14. 
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shopping in brick-and-mortar stores declines.22  While it would be an 
oversimplification of a complex issue to say that e-commerce is wholly 
responsible for the downfall of the brick-and-mortar, the former certainly 
appears to have stolen some of the latter’s financial thunder.23 
Some companies, however, are adapting to the change.  After 
integrating its physical storefronts with new online platforms, the home 
improvement retail chain Home Depot saw a 6% increase in sales for its U.S. 
stores and generated $90 billion in annual revenue in 2016, all without 
opening any new storefronts in the last three years.24  Its online sales revenues 
rose from 1% in 2011 to 5.6% in 2016.25  Walmart is another example, 
announcing a whopping 63% growth in its e-commerce sales in the second 
fiscal quarter of 2017, as well as an overall rise in sales.26  Its announcement 
came in the year following Walmart’s overhaul of its e-commerce strategy, 
which included the $3.3 billion purchase of Jet, a successful online bulk 
retailer.27  Both companies have developed ways to expand their internet 
retail presence to take advantage of the online marketplace, and both 
companies have experienced concurrent increases in overall sales. 
The lesson to be learned from these examples is among the most 
fundamental of business principles: adapt to survive.  And this principle 
extends not only to companies, but to state governments as well.  Because 
state governments derive a large amount of their tax revenue from sales and 
use taxes, they are in many ways dependent upon the retail market for 
income.28  In the first fiscal quarter of 2017, sales and gross receipts taxes 
accounted for $72.4 billion, or 31.4% of total tax revenue.29  This marked an 
increase of 2.3% from the same quarter in 2016,30 indicating an increased 
reliance on sales tax for state tax revenue.  That reliance is even higher in 
some regions of the United States.  In the South, for instance, sales and gross 
                                               
 22. Id. (identifying the “rise in e-commerce” as a contributor to the decline of brick and 
mortar shopping). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Here’s How Home Depot’s E-Commerce Strategy is Driving Growth, FORBES (Feb. 
15, 2017, 1:41 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2017/02/15/heres-how-
home-depots-e-commerce-strategy-is-driving-growth/#41a5650e9b62. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Rachel Abrams, Walmart, With Amazon in Its Cross Hairs, Posts E-Commerce 
Gains, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/business/walmart-
online-sales-jump-63-percent.html?mcubz=3. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Semuels, supra note 4. 
 29. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, QUARTERLY SUMMARY OF STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE FOR 2017: Q1 2017), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Cen
sus/library/publications/2017/econ/g17-qtax1.pdf [hereinafter TAX REVENUE SUMMARY 2017: 
Q1]. 
 30. Id. 
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receipts make up 40.4% of state tax revenue,31 and some local governments 
receive half of their budgets from sales taxes levied on top of the state rates.32 
As a result, there is a positive correlation between taxable retail sales 
and state tax revenue: where taxable sales have begun to stagnate, so too have 
tax revenues.  From 2013 to 2014, sales tax revenue rose 5.6%.33  By contrast, 
sales tax revenue rose only 2% between the first quarters of 2016 and 2017.34  
The term “rose” may be misleading in this context. While the first quarter of 
2017 still reported a growth, the rate of the growth was significantly lower 
than that of the 2013–2014 year, which is troubling when one considers that 
state spending is also increasing each year.35 
To repurpose a popular analogy,36 state budgets are leaky buckets 
from which an ever-increasing flow of water escapes in the form of public 
expenditures.  The leak is immaterial as long as the output is as great or 
greater than the input.  But where, as here, a source of income is petering out 
while expenditures continue to grow, it poses a significant problem for state 
economies.  If trends continue as is, sales tax growth will continue to decrease 
while government expenditures continue to increase.  Prospectively, this 
threatens the tax-dependent economies of states and local governments, 
particularly those who derive so much of their revenue from retail sales tax.37  
When the amount of water entering a leaky bucket fails to match or exceed 
the amount leaving it, the bucket will eventually run dry. 
To limit their dependency on a declining revenue source and keep up 
with growing expenditures, states have begun to look to other markets to 
supplement their income.  E-commerce is a rapidly expanding arena in retail 
that would help bolster sales tax revenue, thus restoring a more comfortable 
balance between output and input in state economies.  If state governments 
                                               
 31. Id. 
 32. Semuels, supra note 4. 
 33. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, QUARTERLY SUMMARY OF STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TAX REVENUE FOR 2014: Q1 (2014), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Ce
nsus/library/publications/2014/econ/g14-qtax1.pdf. 
 34. TAX REVENUE SUMMARY 2017: Q1, supra note 29. 
 35. “Direct state and local spending on general government increased from 
approximately $1.1 billion in 1977 (in inflation-adjusted 2015 dollars) to $2.8 billion in 
2015—a 170 percent increase over 38 years.” State and Local Expenditures, THE URBAN INST., 
http://www.urban.org/policy-centers/cross-center-initiatives/state-local-finance-
initiative/projects/state-and-local-backgrounders/state-and-local-expenditures (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2017). 
 36. The leaky bucket analogy derives from Arthur Okun’s theory on public economics 
and the redistribution of wealth. See Bill Conerly, Economic Impacts of Inequality, FORBES 
(Aug. 18, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2014/08/18/economic-impacts-of-
inequality/#1a01e4f2530c. 
 37. Consider again those Southern states and local governments who derive as much as 
half of their income from sales and use taxes. See TAX REVENUE SUMMARY 2017: Q1, supra 
note 29; Semuels, supra note 4. 
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can develop a way to effectively access that revenue source—as some of the 
forward-thinking companies described above have done, to their notable 
benefit—then they may secure a flourishing resource that will help sustain 
their economies in the fast-approaching future. 
II. INTERNET RETAIL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE PHYSICAL 
PRESENCE REQUIREMENT 
Having established that states would likely benefit from imposing 
sales and use taxes on internet retail, two inquiries naturally arise.  First, do 
states have the authority to impose such a tax?  And second, if they do have 
the authority, how should states go about incorporating an e-commerce sales 
and use tax into their state taxation schemes?  These questions form the basis 
of discussion for Parts II through V. 
With regard to the first question—whether or not states have the 
authority to systemically tax e-commerce—the short answer was, until 
recently, a qualified “no.”  No, because there have historically been 
significant obstacles to imposing sales and use tax on large portions of e-
commerce revenue.  Qualified, because as in many other areas of the law, the 
answer here is vastly more complex than a simple “yes” or “no.” 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that not all forms of 
e-commerce are created equally, at least, not for purposes of sales and use 
taxation.  The term “e-commerce” casts a very broad net.  It has been defined 
as “[t]he practice of buying and selling goods and services through online 
consumer services and of conducting other business activities using an 
electronic device and the Internet.”38  This definition includes both (1) 
internet retailers that are located within the territorial boundaries of the state, 
be it through their headquarters, storefronts, distribution centers, etc.; and (2) 
internet retailers located out-of-state, with no physical presence within the 
territorial bounds of the state.  The second category may be interchangeably 
referred to as “remote retailers” or “out-of-state sellers.”39 
In the past, these two categories of e-commerce have not always 
received the same treatment for tax purposes.40  Taxes imposed on out-of-
state sellers who nonetheless maintained a physical location within the taxing 
                                               
 38. E-commerce, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 39. “Out-of-state seller[s]” refers to those retailers whose place of incorporation or 
principal place of business is not the state imposing the tax. See Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex 
rel. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 302 (1992), overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 
S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (using the term to refer to a business incorporated in Delaware with offices 
in Illinois, California, and Georgia, that was operating in North Dakota); Nat’l Bellas Hess, 
Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 753-54 (1967) (referring to a business incorporated 
in Delaware with its principal place of business in North Kansas, doing business in Illinois). 
 40. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. 753. 
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state have been upheld,41 while taxes imposed on out-of-state sellers with no 
physical locations in the taxing state have been invalidated.42  These 
disparities may seem arbitrary at first glance, but in reality, they reflect the 
changing approaches to taxing out-of-state retailers. 
Judicial approaches to taxing out-of-state retailers revolve primarily 
around two constitutional limits on a state’s power to tax: the Due Process 
Clause and the Commerce Clause.43  Within the last fifty years, the 
interpretations and applications of these constitutional limitations have 
changed significantly with regard to taxation by implementing different 
presence requirements for out-of-state retailers in the taxing states.  This, in 
turn, has placed and removed obstacles for states hoping to impose taxes on 
e-commerce retailers, including those with and without physical presences in 
the taxing state. 
To understand how these obstacles have arisen and changed over the 
course of the last half-century, case law in the area is highly instructive.  In 
particular, three cases out of the United States Supreme Court highlight the 
changing treatment of out-of-state retail sales tax.  The first, National Bellas 
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of State of Illinois (“Bellas Hess”), 
established a bright-line rule for analyzing state taxes under the constitutional 
requirement of Due Process.44  The second, Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel. 
North Dakota (“Quill”), replaced the Bellas Hess rule for Due Process 
analyses and, in the same decision, preserved it for analyses under the 
Commerce Clause.45  Finally, the third case, Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl 
(“Direct Marketing”), signaled the Court’s changing attitude toward the 
physical presence requirement and paved the way for the latest shift in e-
commerce taxation jurisprudence.46 
A. Due Process and the Bellas Hess Bright-Line 
In 1967, the mail order company National Bellas Hess (“National”) 
appeared before the U.S. Supreme Court in an action to recover assessed use 
taxes.47  These taxes were paid to the Department of Revenue of the State of 
Illinois, the defendant in the case, in accordance with section 439.3 of the 
                                               
 41. Id. at 757 (noting that a state’s taxing power has been upheld where a mail order 
seller maintained local retail stores). 
 42. Id. at 758 (“But the Court has never held that a State may impose the duty of use tax 
collection and payment upon a seller whose only connection with customers in the State is by 
common carrier or the United States mail.”). 
 43. Quill, 504 U.S. at 305. 
 44. See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753. 
 45. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 298. 
 46. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124 (2015). 
 47. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753-54. 
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Illinois Use Tax Act of 1965.48  The act provided, in relevant part, that any 
retailer “[e]ngaging in soliciting orders within [Illinois] from users by means 
of catalogues or other advertising” could be classified as retailers doing 
business in the state.49  As one such retailer, National was required to collect 
use taxes on any sales it made to customers within the State of Illinois.50  The 
Illinois Supreme Court noted the following in its opinion: 
(National) does not maintain in Illinois any office, 
distribution house, sales house, warehouse or any other place 
of business; it does not have in Illinois any agent, salesman, 
canvasser, solicitor or other type of representative to sell or 
take orders, to deliver merchandise, to accept payments, or 
to service merchandise it sells; it does not own any tangible 
property, real or personal, in Illinois; it has no telephone 
listing in Illinois and it has not advertised its merchandise 
for sale in newspapers, on billboards, or by radio or 
television in Illinois.51 
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted this factual finding.52 
National filed suit, arguing that Illinois’s tax code violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and unconstitutionally 
burdened interstate commerce.53  The Court in Bellas Hess agreed.54  In its 
decision, the Court recognized that the Due Process Clause permits states to 
levy taxes on out-of-state businesses only when the state “has given 
[something] for which it can ask return.”55  This can be measured in terms of 
opportunities, benefits, or protection that the state has afforded the business.56  
The Bellas Hess Court therefore required “‘some definite link, some 
minimum connection’” between the state and the retailer it sought to tax.57 
With respect to out-of-state sellers, the Court was willing to grant the 
existence of minimum contacts where the retailer “maintained local retail 
stores” or had agents operating locally in the state.58  However, where a 
seller’s “only connection with customers in the State [was] by common 
                                               
 48. Id. at 754. 
 49. Id. at 755. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 754. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 756. 
 54. Id. at 760. 
 55. Id. at 765 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940)). 
 56. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. at 444. 
 57. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756 (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 
344–45 (1954)). 
 58. Id. at 757. 
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carrier or the United States mail,” the Court found that imposing taxes 
violated Due Process.59  Such sellers did not receive sufficient benefits from 
the state for the state to exact taxes.60  In making this distinction, the Court 
in Bellas Hess essentially created a bright-line rule for taxation and Due 
Process: retailers must have some form of physical presence in a state—i.e., 
a storefront, local sales force, or office—in order to be subject to the state’s 
use tax laws.61  Under the Bellas Hess holding, states imposing taxes on 
retailers without a physical presence would have “no legitimate claim to 
impose ‘a fair share of the cost of the local government’” and would 
unjustifiably impose significant burdens on out-of-state retailers.62  In this 
way, according to the Court, legislation like the Illinois Use Tax Act would 
undermine the very purpose of the Commerce Clause, which is to protect the 
national economy from such unjustifiable burdens.63 
While e-commerce was almost certainly not contemplated in the 
1967 Bellas Hess decision, some of the principles set forth by the Court are 
still applicable.  Chiefly, although physical presence is no longer a bright-
line requirement for taxing out-of-state retailers, it will generally be 
sufficient to establish a taxable nexus with the state.64  Relating this premise 
back to the earlier discussion of the categories of e-commerce, internet 
retailers that do have a physical presence within the taxing state will likely 
be subject to the sales and use tax schemes of that state.  The more difficult 
inquiry, and the one more germane to the goals of this discussion, is whether 
retailers that do not have a physical presence within the taxing state—remote 
internet retailers—may be required to collect sales and use tax.  For this 
inquiry, it is instructive to look to subsequent changes in the law, beginning 
with the rule set forth in Quill. 
                                               
 59. Id. at 758. 
 60. Id. 
 61. This bright-line rule was later expressly expanded to include sales tax, in addition 
to the original use tax. Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 315 (1992), 
overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (“Whether or not a State 
may compel a vendor to collect a sales or use tax may turn on the presence in the taxing State 
of a small sales force, plant, or office.”). 
 62. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760. If other states imposed upon out-of-state retailers their 
own varied tax rates, allowable exemptions, and record-keeping requirements, it would 
“entangle [retailers’] interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local 
jurisdictions[.]” Id. at 759–60. 
 63. Id. at 760. 
 64. As will be discussed in the next subsection, the modern inquiry for Due Process is 
“whether a defendant’s contacts with the forum made it reasonable, in the context of our 
federal system of Government, to require it to defend the suit in that State.” Quill, 504 U.S. at 
307. Purposeful availment via physical presence in the state likely satisfies this requirement. 
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B. Quill and the Commerce Clause 
Approximately twenty-five years after its decision in Bellas Hess, 
the U.S. Supreme Court was again called upon to address the issue of 
imposing sales and use taxes on remote retailers.65  The Supreme Court ruled 
on Quill in 1992, which provided, until recently, the controlling 
jurisprudence on e-commerce taxation.66 
The case began when the State of North Dakota filed an action 
seeking declaratory judgment against Quill Corporation (“Quill Corp.”) that 
would require Quill Corp. to collect and pay a use tax on goods purchased 
for use within the state.67  Quill Corp. was a mail-order office supply 
company with no offices, warehouses, employees, or significant personal 
property in North Dakota.68  All sales to North Dakota customers, which 
amounted to approximately $1 million annually, were fulfilled via mail or 
common carrier.69 
Similarly to Illinois in Bellas Hess, North Dakota’s use tax statute 
required every “retailer maintaining a place of business” in the state to collect 
a use tax.70  Included in this classification was “every person who engages in 
regular or systematic solicitation of a consumer market in th[e] state.”71  
Therefore, North Dakota claimed that Quill Corp. should have been required 
to collect and pay a use tax on any items sold for use in the state, irrespective 
of its lack of physical presence in North Dakota.72 
In addressing the claim, the Court considered whether the tax 
conformed with requirements under both the Due Process Clause and the 
Commerce Clause.73  If the Court had chosen to apply the bright-line physical 
presence requirement laid out in Bellas Hess, the tax almost certainly would 
have failed Due Process muster.  However, as the Court noted, its Due 
Process jurisprudence had “evolved substantially in the [twenty-five] years 
since Bellas Hess,” largely precipitated by changes in personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence.74  Historically, courts relied on physical presence within a 
                                               
 65. Id. at 298. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 302. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 302–03. 
 72. Id. at 301. 
 73. Id. at 305. 
 74. Id. at 307. The interrelatedness of these two concepts—personal jurisdiction and 
taxation power—derives from their shared origin. Both arise from the Due Process 
requirement of the Federal Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment, which limits a state’s 
power to affect the rights and obligations of persons not within that state’s sovereign authority. 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878). Both require “minimum contacts” to be established 
2019] THE WAKE OF WAYFAIR 295 
 
state’s territorial jurisdiction to satisfy Due Process.75  As forms of notice—
that is, service of summons—began to change, the Supreme Court shifted the 
cornerstone of Due Process from the rigid physical presence requirement to 
something less mechanical.76 
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Court articulated the 
test for Due Process as it pertained to in personam jurisdiction:  whether 
maintaining a state’s jurisdiction would offend “traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.”77  This standard extended to corporations as 
well as individuals,78 and in 1977, the standard was further extended by 
Shaffer v. Heitner, to cover “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction[.]”79  
Under the interpretation set out in International Shoe and extended by 
Shaffer, the Due Process Clause was satisfied when a corporation had “such 
contacts . . . with the state of the forum as to make it reasonable.”80  Under 
this test, even if a corporation had no physical presence in the taxing state, it 
could be subject to a state’s jurisdiction if it had “purposefully avail[ed] itself 
of the benefits of an economic market in the forum State.”81  Stated another 
way, the Supreme Court has consistently rejected the notion that a lack of 
physical contact in a state can defeat personal jurisdiction there.82 
This test reflected the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “minimum 
contacts” at the time of Quill.83  Accordingly, rather than relying on Bellas 
Hess’s outmoded physical presence requirement, the Court in Quill looked 
to the Due Process test prescribed in International Shoe.84  Under this test, 
the Court found that the Due Process Clause did not bar enforcement of North 
Dakota’s use tax statute because Quill Corp. had purposefully directed 
                                               
between the state and the party sought to be brought within the state’s authority, be that 
authority commercial or judicial. See also, Quill, 504 U.S. at 298 (requiring “minimum 
contacts” for imposing sales and use taxes); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash. Office of Unemployment 
Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (requiring “minimum contacts” for the 
maintenance of a suit by a state court). Accordingly, as the Court’s interpretation of “minimum 
contacts” changes with personal jurisdiction case law, so too does it change with respect to 
tax law. 
 75. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 316–17. 
 79. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977). 
 80. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317. 
 81. Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992), overruled 
by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
 82. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). 
 83. Although Bellas Hess was decided in 1967, a full twenty-two years after 
International Shoe, the Court’s subsequent applications of the International Shoe standard 
placed it closer in time to the Quill decision of 1992. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 307 (referencing 
Shaffer and Burger King). 
 84. Id. at 308. 
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business activities at North Dakota residents with sufficient magnitude, such 
that imposing the tax would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”85  This marked a significant shift from the mechanical 
physical presence test of Bellas Hess.  Under the new rule, it was possible for 
a company like Quill Corp., whose only contacts with a state were through 
mail and common carrier, to be subject to that state’s use tax laws—at least 
as far as Due Process restrictions were concerned.  Applying that same 
principle to remote internet retailers, a state could theoretically impose sales 
and use tax on sales made within the state without violating the Due Process 
Clause.86 
If the analysis had ended there, states would have at least had a 
chance of enforcing sales and use taxes against individual retailers, assuming 
they could prove minimum contacts.  However, the constitutionality analysis 
for properly imposing a tax is two-fold.  And, as the Court in Quill pointed 
out, “while a state may, consistent with the Due Process Clause, have the 
authority to tax a particular taxpayer, imposition of the tax may nonetheless 
violate the Commerce Clause.”87  It is the latter wherein lay a persisting 
obstacle to taxing remote internet retailers: the Commerce Clause and its 
penumbra, the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
By its express language, the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution provides Congress the power “to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations, and among the several states[.]”88  However, the Commerce 
Clause has been read by the Supreme Court to include a sort of “negative” or 
“dormant” aspect in addition to its affirmative grant of power to Congress.89  
The Dormant Commerce Clause acts through the courts even “in the absence 
of any action by Congress,” with the purpose of preventing economic 
isolationism.90  In other words, the courts use the Dormant Commerce Clause 
to strike down state laws that unduly burden the flow of commerce across 
state borders, including by taxing interstate commerce.91 
                                               
 85. Id. 
 86. This assumes, for argument’s sake, that the magnitude of the retailer’s contacts with 
the state would be sufficient. The Court in Quill does not discuss at any length how to 
determine magnitude of contacts, but given that Quill Corp. sold approximately $1 million in 
North Dakota, it is likely fair to say that sales over $1 million in the taxing state would be 
sufficient to satisfy Due Process requirements. 
 87. Id. at 305. 
 88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 89. E.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192 (1994) (recognizing a 
“negative” aspect of the Commerce Clause that prohibits economic protectionism and undue 
burdens on interstate commerce). 
 90. Quill, 504 U.S. at 309. 
 91. See, e.g., id. at 309–10. 
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It is within this authority that the Quill Court undertook its 
Commerce Clause analysis of the North Dakota tax.92  To be sustained 
against a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge, a tax must (1) be applied to 
an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) be fairly 
apportioned, (3) not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) be 
fairly related to the services provided by the state.93  Both Bellas Hess and 
Quill draw specific attention to the first requirement, the “substantial nexus” 
requirement.94  The question then becomes whether contact solely through 
mail or common carrier, as is the case with remote retailers, is sufficient to 
establish a substantial nexus with the taxing state.  North Dakota argued that 
it must be sufficient if that same conduct was sufficient to satisfy the Due 
Process Clause.95 
The Supreme Court disagreed.96  In defense of this position, it 
explained the fundamental differences between the Due Process Clause and 
the Commerce Clause: the former is intended to ensure fairness, while the 
latter is designed to protect the structure of the nation’s economy.97  Included 
among these structural concerns is that of interstate commerce,98 which 
Bellas Hess found to be unduly burdened by the taxation of remote retailers.99  
The Court in Quill seemed to agree with that assessment, finding that “the 
bright-line rule of Bellas Hess furthers the ends of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause” by ensuring retailers receive some benefit from the states before 
being subjected to taxes by those states.100  Accordingly, the Court preserved 
the physical presence requirement of Bellas Hess for purposes of the 
Commerce Clause—but not for the Due Process Clause—and ultimately 
determined that North Dakota could not require Quill Corp. to collect use 
taxes for sales in the state.101 
                                               
 92. Id. at 311. 
 93. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
 94. Quill, 504 U.S. at 311. 
 95. “The State contends that the nexus requirements imposed by the Due Process and 
Commerce Clauses are equivalent and that if, as we concluded above, a mail-order house that 
lacks a physical presence in the taxing State nonetheless satisfies the due process ‘minimum 
contacts’ test, then that corporation also meets the Commerce Clause ‘substantial nexus’ test.” 
Id. at 312. 
 96. Id; see also the discussion supra note 62 (relating to the unjustifiable burdens of 
allowing states to impose varied tax requirements on out-of-state sellers, which in turn receive 
little to no benefit from the states). 
 97. Quill, 504 U.S. at 312. 
 98. Id. (“Accordingly, we have ruled that [the Commerce Clause] prohibits 
discrimination against interstate commerce . . . and bars state regulations that unduly burden 
interstate commerce[.]”) (citations omitted). 
 99. Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759–60 (1967). 
 100. Quill, 504 U.S. at 314–15. 
 101. Id. at 318–19. 
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This holding severely limited states’ authority to tax certain types of 
e-commerce revenue.  Under Quill, states were generally able to reach the 
sales of local internet retailers and even out-of-state retailers with a physical 
presence in the state.102  However, Quill effectively blocked states from 
taxing an entire category of internet retailers—the remote retailers.  The 
physical presence requirement barred the imposition of taxes on these 
retailers, irrespective of the amount of otherwise taxable sales done in the 
state.  As a result, even though states could access some internet retailers for 
sales and use tax purposes, Quill remained a significant obstacle to states’ 
ability to fully capitalize on the e-commerce marketplace.  However, Quill 
was not without opposition, and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in the Direct 
Marketing decision in 2015, as well as Justice White’s separate opinion in 
Quill itself, may well have laid the foundation for Quill’s ultimate demise. 
C. Judicial Criticism of the Quill Decision 
In 2015, Kennedy called upon the Court to strongly reconsider its 
holding in Quill—and to do it quickly.103  “Given [the] changes in technology 
and consumer sophistication,” he wrote in his concurring opinion to Direct 
Marketing, “it is unwise to delay any longer a reconsideration of the Court’s 
holding in Quill.”104  He cited a nearly $3 billion increase in e-commerce 
sales per year between the Court’s decision in Quill and 2008, illustrating 
how “urgent” the cause for reconsideration has become.105  Quill’s 
incompatibility with the changing times “inflict[s] extreme harm and 
unfairness on the [s]tates.”106  This call to action signaled an awareness in the 
Supreme Court that Quill no longer suited the nation’s economy or, indeed, 
                                               
 102. Some states have also found that the physical presence requirement for substantial 
nexus may be satisfied “by others’ in-state activities taken on behalf of an out-of-state 
retailer.” This form of satisfaction has been referred to as “attributional nexus.” Here, for 
example, an independent contractor—rather than an out-and-out employee—acting on a 
retailer’s behalf could be sufficient to establish a nexus with the state seeking to impose sales 
and use tax on the retailer’s sales in the state. Andrew J. Haile, Affiliate Nexus in E-Commerce, 
33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1803, 1811–12 (2012). 
 103. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Kennedy writes, “When the Court decided Quill, mail-order sales in the United 
States totaled $180 billion. But in 1992, the Internet was in its infancy. By 2008, e-commerce 
sales alone totaled $3.16 trillion per year in the United States.” Id. (citations omitted). 
Additionally, Kennedy points to “shortfall[s]” in state revenues, “unfairness to local retailers 
and their customers who do pay taxes at the register,” and losses arising from an inability to 
tax sales from out-of-state vendors. Id. For example, “Colorado’s losses in 2012 [were] 
estimated to be around $170 million.” Id. 
 106. Id. at 1134. 
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even its jurisprudence.107  It also showed a willingness—and, arguably, a 
demand—to change it. 
Furthermore, Kennedy’s call to reconsider was not the first decrial 
of the majority opinion in Quill.  Three of the justices who concurred in the 
holding, including Kennedy, did so “based on stare decisis alone,” creating 
a “tenuous” foundation upon which the ruling rests.108  It is also worth noting 
that the Quill Court’s partial upholding of Bellas Hess did not reflect the will 
of the entire Court of its time.109  Through his partial dissent, White offered 
some constructive insight into why the Court’s holding was perhaps in error, 
and why the Court might consider “giving Bellas Hess the complete burial it 
justly deserves” thereafter.110 
As a starting point, White rejected the distinctions that the majority 
drew between the “substantial nexus” requirements under Due Process, 
which the majority described as a fairness inquiry, and those under the 
Commerce Clause, which the majority found to be largely structural.111  
Citing precedent, White asserted that the substantial nexus requirement was 
“grounded in the Due Process Clause, and not the Commerce Clause,” and 
that there was no independent substantial nexus requirement under the 
Commerce Clause.112  Consequently, in his view, there was no precedent nor 
justification for finding a nexus sufficient under one and insufficient under 
the other.113 
Without recognizing an independent nexus requirement for the 
Commerce Clause, the holding in Quill would have likely been very 
different: the contacts would have either failed under both clauses or 
succeeded under both clauses.  Given the Court’s more flexible inquiry for 
Due Process considerations under International Shoe,114 the argument could 
                                               
 107. Kennedy notes that, “In Quill, the Court should have taken the opportunity to 
reevaluate Bellas Hess not only in light of Complete Auto but also in view of the dramatic 
technological and social changes that had taken place in our increasingly interconnected 
economy.” Id. at 1134–35. 
 108. Id. at 1134. Kennedy calls Quill “[a] case questionable even when decided.” Id. at 
1135. 
 109. White wrote a partial dissent to the majority’s opinion, while Justice Scalia (with 
Kennedy and Justice Thomas joining) set out to qualify their concurrence with upholding the 
Commerce Clause portion of the Bellas Hess decision. See Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel. 
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 
2080 (2018). 
 110. Id. at 322 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part). 
 111. Id. at 325. 
 112. Id. at 327. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Part II-b for a discussion on the adoption and application of the International 
Shoe standard. 
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be made that the Court would have done away with the physical presence 
requirement entirely. 
However, even if this distinction remained good law, White posited 
that the physical presence requirement had still outlived its usefulness.115  In 
his opinion, “physical presence frequently [had] very little to do with a 
transaction a State might seek to tax,”116 and out-of-state sellers still benefited 
from the infrastructures of the states in which they did business.117  He 
explained: 
Nevertheless, an out-of-state direct marketer derives 
numerous commercial benefits from the State in which it 
does business. These advantages include laws establishing 
sound local banking institutions to support credit 
transactions; courts to ensure collection of the purchase price 
from the seller’s customers; means of waste disposal from 
garbage generated by mail-order solicitations; and creation 
and enforcement of consumer protection laws, which protect 
buyers and sellers alike, the former by ensuring that they will 
have a ready means of protecting against fraud, and the latter 
by creating a climate of consumer confidence that inures to 
the benefit of reputable dealers in mail-order transactions.118 
In so recognizing, White established a cognizable argument against 
the physical presence requirement, even through the structural lens of the 
Commerce Clause.  By accessing a state’s financial institutions, its courts, 
and its public services—even without a physical presence in the taxing 
state—remote retailers would seem to obligate themselves to contribute their 
just share of the state tax burden.  Otherwise, the Quill Court risked 
“perpetuating a rule that create[d] an interstate tax shelter for one form of 
business”119—in this case, internet retailers—without offering a comparable 
advantage for its competitors.  Kennedy echoed this point in his Direct 
Marketing concurrence, discussing the “concomitant unfairness to local 
retailers and their customers” of, effectively, shielding remote retailers from 
sales tax obligations.120 
                                               
 115. Quill, 504 U.S. at 327–28. 
 116. Id. at 328. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 329 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part). 
 120. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
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Additionally, while the physical presence requirement was heralded 
by the Court to establish clear-cut boundaries for states’ tax authority,121 as 
well as encourage “settled expectations” for businesses and investors,122 
subsequent caselaw showed that the physical presence requirement was 
perhaps not as clear-cut as the Quill majority suggested.  White’s dissent 
provided some guidance in that regard, as well.123  While the bright-line test 
is more concrete than, say, a balancing inquiry, it still raised a vital question: 
what constitutes “physical presence”?  As White pointed out, “[r]easonable 
minds surely can, and will, differ over what showing is required to make out 
a ‘physical presence’ adequate to justify imposing responsibilities for use tax 
collection.”124 
This proverbial gray area invited what might be construed as veiled 
judicial resistance by lower courts to the full sweep of Quill.  For example, 
in National Geographic Society v. California Board of Equalization 
(“National Geographic”), the Court found that a company with two offices 
in the State still had a sufficient nexus with the State to be subject to use 
tax.125  On its face, this holding seems unproblematic.  However, when one 
considers that each office housed only one salesperson and one secretary,126 
and that both offices together made only $1 million annually in sales,127 the 
case begins to raise concerns: namely, how much physical presence is 
required to justify imposing sales tax liability? 
In National Geographic, the Court expressly rejected a “slightest 
presence” standard for satisfying physical presence.128  However, that 
qualification in and of itself, as White pointed out in Quill, would seem to 
shift the test away from a true bright-line rule.129  If too little physical 
presence will not satisfy the test, then where and how should that line be 
drawn?  To determine physical presence, should courts look at the number of 
employees in the taxing state?  The number of offices?  The amount of 
property owned in the taxing state?  With shoppers’ favorite stores just “a 
click away—regardless of how close or far the nearest storefront[,]” Kennedy 
                                               
 121. Thus, reducing litigation concerning those taxes. Quill, 504 U.S. at 315–16. 
 122. Id. at 316. 
 123. See id. at 330 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part). 
 124. Id. at 330–31. 
 125. See Nat’l Geographic Soc’y. v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977). 
 126. Id. at 554 n.2. 
 127. Id. at 556. Compare this to Quill Corp., which also made almost $1 million sales to 
about 3,000 customers in North Dakota and was the sixth largest vendor of office supplies in 
the state, but who under the Quill decision, was not liable for North Dakota sales tax. Quill, 
504 U.S. at 302. 
 128. Nat’l Geographic, 430 U.S. at 556. 
 129. Quill, 504 U.S. at 330 (“In my view, the question of Quill’s actual physical presence 
is sufficiently close to cast doubt on the majority’s confidence that it is propounding a truly 
‘bright-line’ rule.”). 
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questioned whether physical presence was even an appropriate metric at 
all.130 
Ultimately, between the lingering uncertainty of the metes and 
bounds of physical presence, the purported unfairness of its protection to 
remote retailers, and the need to respond to the ever-changing reality of e-
commerce, it was perhaps only a matter of time before the Court reconsidered 
the place of physical presence in e-commerce taxation.131 
III. THE WAYFAIR DECISION 
Nearly twenty-five years after its decision in Quill, the Supreme 
Court was presented with the opportunity to revisit its position on the 
physical presence requirement for internet retail taxation.  That opportunity 
came when South Dakota enacted Senate Bill 106 (“S. 106”) in 2016.132 S. 
106 was enacted “to provide for the collection of sales taxes from certain 
remote sellers, to establish certain Legislative findings, and to declare an 
emergency.”133  In effect, S. 106 “requires out-of-state sellers to collect and 
remit sales tax ‘as if the seller had a physical presence in the state.’”134  South 
Dakota limited the reach of S. 106, however, by (1) restricting its application 
to remote retailers that, “on an annual basis, deliver more than $100,000 of 
goods or services into the State or engage in 200 or more separate 
transactions for the delivery of goods or services into the State”; (2) 
foreclosing any retroactive application of the Act’s sales tax collection and 
remission requirements; and (3) staying the Act’s effective date until the 
constitutionality of the law could be established.135 
To satisfy the third limitation and to conform to provisions of S. 106 
requiring “expeditious judicial review,” South Dakota filed a declaratory 
judgment action in state court against a number of merchants making sales 
in South Dakota, including Wayfair, Inc., which each had no employees or 
real estate in the state and collected no South Dakota sales tax on its 
transactions.136  The action sought “a declaration that the requirements of the 
Act [were] valid and applicable to respondents and an injunction requiring 
                                               
 130. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 131. See id. (“The legal system should find an appropriate case for this Court to 
reexamine Quill and Bellas Hess.”). 
 132. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (“In 2016, South Dakota 
confronted the serious inequity Quill imposes by enacting . . . S. 106, 2016 Legis. Assemb., 
91st Sess. (S.D. 2016)[.]”). 
 133. Id. at 2088. 
 134. Id. at 2089. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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respondents to register for licenses to collect and remit sales tax,” despite the 
Bellas Hess and Quill precedent clearly requiring physical presence for the 
imposition of sales tax requirements.137 
Indeed, South Dakota plainly recognized the conflicting precedent. 
In response to the merchants’ motion for summary judgment at the trial court 
level, South Dakota “conceded that [S. 106 could not] survive under Bellas 
Hess and Quill”; however, it asked the judiciary to reconsider those decisions 
“in light of current economic realities.”138  The trial court granted the 
merchants’ motion for summary judgment, and the South Dakota Supreme 
Court affirmed based upon existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent.139  In 
January 2018, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider, once again, 
whether physical presence should remain the standard for e-commerce and 
remote retail taxation.140 
A. The Wayfair Decision 
Arguments for South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. (“Wayfair”) were heard 
in April 2018, and on June 21, 2018, the Wayfair Court issued the opinion 
that would be the death knell for the physical presence requirement in e-
commerce taxation.141  A closely-divided Supreme Court elected to uphold 
the South Dakota tax scheme, and in doing so, overruled the Quill decision 
and the common law it had created.142  It did so on the belief that “Quill was 
flawed on its own terms.”143  Specifically, the Court highlighted three 
weaknesses of Quill that, in its view, established the need to change 
directions: (1) Quill’s flawed interpretation of the nexus requirement; (2) the 
generation, rather than resolution, of “market distortions” by the physical 
presence requirement; and (3) the “arbitrary, formalistic distinction[s]” 
imposed by Quill, which “modern Commerce Clause precedents 
                                               
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. In its opinion, the South Dakota Supreme Court stated, “However persuasive the 
State’s arguments on the merits of revisiting the issue, Quill has not been overruled. Quill 
remains the controlling precedent on the issue of Commerce Clause limitations on interstate 
collection of sales and use taxes” and elected to “leave to that Court ‘the prerogative of 
overruling its own decisions.’” State v. Wayfair Inc., 901 N.W.2d 754, 761 (S.D. 2017), cert. 
granted South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 735 (2018), and vacated and remanded 
South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
 140. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 735. 
 141. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080. 
 142. The decision was 5–4, with Kennedy delivering the opinion of the Court, in which 
Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, and Gorsuch joined; Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filing 
concurring opinions; and Chief Justice Roberts filing a dissenting opinion, in which Justices 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Id. at 2087. 
 143. Id. at 2092. 
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disavow.”144  As discussed in greater detail below, many of these criticisms 
track with previous concerns raised about the Quill decision. 
First, the Court stated that physical presence is not necessary to 
create a substantial nexus with a state for purposes of imposing a sales tax.145  
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has consistently taken the position 
that “a business need not have a physical presence in a State to satisfy the 
demands of due process.”146  In that regard, the Quill Court was in harmony 
with its successors in Wayfair; it held that, for purposes of Due Process, 
physical presence was unnecessary.147  Where the Quill Court erred, 
according to Wayfair, was in applying a different rule to substantial nexus 
determinations under the Commerce Clause.148  Rather, neither Due Process 
nor the Commerce Clause requires physical contact with the taxing state; 
instead, “[t]here just must be ‘a substantial nexus with the taxing State.’”149  
Further, the Wayfair Court stated that the sale of goods or services into a 
taxing state “has a sufficient nexus to the State in which the sale is 
consummated to be treated as a local transaction taxable by that State.”150  
Accordingly, because S. 106 applies only to sales of “tangible personal 
property, products transferred electronically, or services for delivery into 
South Dakota[,]”151 and further, only to retailers that do either $100,000 
worth in sales or 200 separate transactions into the state, the Wayfair Court 
found that there was a substantial nexus, regardless of the merchants’ lack of 
physical presence in South Dakota.152 
Second, the Court raised concerns about market interference created 
by the physical presence requirement of Quill.153  By prohibiting states from 
taxing remote retailers, Quill effectively established a sort of judicially-
created tax shelter for those retailers, while shifting the tax burden to local 
retailers and their customers.154  Remote retailers had a competitive 
advantage because they could avoid the “regulatory burdens of tax 
                                               
 144. Id. at 2085. 
 145. Id. at 2093. 
 146. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)). 
 147. Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 308 (1992), overruled 
by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
 148. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (“When considering whether a State may levy a tax, 
Due Process and Commerce Clause standards may not be identical or coterminous, but there 
are significant parallels. The reasons given in Quill for rejecting the physical presence rule for 
due process purposes apply as well to the question whether physical presence is a requisite for 
an out-of-state seller’s liability to remit sales taxes.”). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 2092. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 2099. 
 153. Id. at 2092. 
 154. Id. at 2094. 
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collection” and offer lower prices to consumers than their local counterparts 
could, solely because they had no real estate or employees in the taxing 
state.155  This criticism echoes Kennedy’s Direct Marketing concurrence, 
where he also expressed concerns about the “unfairness” of excusing remote 
retailers from paying their “fair share” of state taxes.156  Furthermore, Quill 
actually incentivized retailers to avoid establishing physical contacts with a 
state, thus discouraging the creation of “storefronts, distribution points, and 
employment centers that otherwise would be efficient or desirable.”157  In 
short, the Wayfair Court found that it is “not the purpose of the [C]ommerce 
[C]lause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share 
of state tax burden,” nor is it the purpose of the Commerce Clause to 
empower the judiciary to distort the marketplace.158  According to the Court, 
The Commerce Clause must not prefer interstate commerce 
only to the point where a merchant physically crosses state 
borders. Rejecting the physical presence rule is necessary to 
ensure that artificial competitive advantages are not created 
by this Court’s precedents. This Court should not prevent 
States from collecting lawful taxes through a physical 
presence rule that can be satisfied only if there is an 
employee or a building in the State.159 
Consequently, in order to abolish any artificial competitive 
advantages created by the Court through its precedent, the Court rejected the 
physical presence requirement and allowed an economic nexus to satisfy the 
Commerce Clause.160 
Third, echoing the criticism of White in his partial dissent of Quill, 
the Wayfair Court decried the physical presence requirement as an 
“anachronistic”161 distinction that “simply makes no sense.”162  The Court 
                                               
 155. Id. The Court also discusses the economic realities supporting the taxation of remote 
retailers, including estimates that Bellas Hess and Quill cause states to lose between $8 and 
$33 billion every year and low consumer compliance rates with use tax collection. Id. at 2088. 
 156. Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 157. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 2094. 
 161. Recall in his partial dissent, White called the physical presence requirement an 
“anachronistic notion” and discussed the illogic of retaining such a requirement for the 
taxation of remote retailers. Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 328 
(2018) (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part), overruled by South 
Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
 162. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094–95. 
306 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:2: 284 
 
used the illustration of two online furniture retailers, one with a warehouse 
in the South Dakota, and one with a warehouse just outside South Dakota 
and a virtual showroom available to consumers to view the selection.163  In 
this thought experiment, which is a reality for online retailers like Wayfair, 
Inc.,164 the first retailer would be subject to South Dakota’s sales tax 
requirements, even for those sales that had nothing to do with the warehouse, 
while the second retailer could not be subjected to the state’s sales tax 
requirements, even if it made the same or greater quantity of sales to South 
Dakota consumers.165  It is, as the Court pointed out, difficult to understand 
why one may be burdened with collecting and remitting sales tax, while the 
other may not, on an “arbitrary” ground such as physical presence.166 
For that reason, and for those discussed before it, the Wayfair Court 
overruled Quill and finally put to rest the physical presence requirement in 
its entirety.167  Without physical presence, the analysis now aligns with the 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady test, which is simply “whether the tax 
applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State.”168  The 
Court applied this new standard to South Dakota’s S. 106, which allows the 
state to impose its sales tax on remote retailers that exceed the de minimis 
threshold of $100,000 or 200 transactions of goods and services delivered 
into the state, and ultimately held that the legislation passed constitutional 
muster.169  The Court reasoned that retailers that exceed the de minimis 
threshold of business into South Dakota and maintain an “extensive” virtual 
presence in the state have “availed [themselves] of the substantial privilege 
of carrying on business in South Dakota.”170  Thus, the substantial nexus 
requirement is satisfied.  This holding marks a new age in remote retail tax 
liability, the effects of which are numerous, varied, and discussed in greater 
detail below. 
                                               
 163. Id. at 2094. 
 164. For example, in 2016, Wayfair, Inc. launched an augmented reality mobile 
application that would allow shoppers to “explore, rearrange, and discover furniture and décor 
from Wayfair’s catalog” against the backdrop of their own outdoor space. Wayfair Launches 
Virtual Reality App to Customize Outdoor Spaces with Furnishings and Décor, WAYFAIR.COM 
(Aug. 23, 2016), https://investor.wayfair.com/investor-relations/press-releases/press-releases-
details/2016/Wayfair-Launches-Virtual-Reality-App-to-Customize-Outdoor-Spaces-with-
Furnishings-and-Dcor/default.aspx. 
 165. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094. 
 166. Id. 2096. 
 167. Id. at 2099. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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B. Effects and Implications of the Wayfair Decision 
As a starting point, the most obvious effect of the Wayfair decision 
is that physical presence is no longer a necessary element of substantial nexus 
for taxing remote retailers.171  That is not to say physical presence is no longer 
considered as part of the substantial nexus analysis; however, it is now 
possible to have the latter without the former.172  From this primary effect, 
however, flow numerous secondary ramifications that will further shape the 
future of e-commerce taxation—some for better, and some, perhaps, for 
worse. 
Under the Wayfair rule, states may now impose taxes on the sales of 
certain retailers with no physical presence within the state.173  This opens the 
field for states to collect what the Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”) estimates to be billions of dollars annually in previously untapped 
revenues.174  In turn, this bolsters states’ sales tax bases, which for some 
states comprise a majority of their general funds.175  And, at least at first 
glance, it also levels the proverbial playing field between local retailers and 
remote retailers with respect to sales tax collection.176 
However, as the dissent in Wayfair indicates, the reality may be more 
complicated than a simple balancing of the scale, and the purported benefits 
of removing the physical presence requirement may also come with notable 
costs.177  Bellas Hess, which first established the physical presence 
requirement and its protection of remote retailers from state sales tax liability, 
was decided in 1967.178  Accordingly, retailers operated under some 
configuration of the physical presence requirement for over fifty years before 
the Wayfair case was decided.  Under that rule, e-commerce grew into a 
thriving, prosperous market,179 and the alteration of that rule should not be 
                                               
 171. Id. at 2097. 
 172. Id. at 2093 (“Although physical presence ‘frequently will enhance’ a business’ 
connection with a State, ‘it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial 
amount of business is transacted . . . [with no] need for physical presence within a state in 
which business is conducted.’”). 
 173. This is not a blanket rule, as discussed later in the section, but the removal of the 
physical presence requirement certainly gives states greater access to a broader range of 
retailers than they preciously had. See id. 
 174. Id. at 2088, 2103 (majority opinion and Roberts, C. J., dissenting, respectively) 
(citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-114, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
REQUESTERS: SALES TAXES, STATES COULD GAIN REVENUE FROM EXPANDED AUTHORITY, BUT 
BUSINESSES ARE LIKELY TO EXPERIENCE COMPLIANCE COSTS 5 (2017)). 
 175. Id. at 2088 (majority opinion). 
 176. Id. at 2094. 
 177. See id. at 2101 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). 
 178. Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
 179. See supra Section I. 
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undertaken lightly.180  A convincing argument could be made, after all, that 
it is not mere coincidence that e-commerce has prospered so greatly under 
the physical presence rule; rather, it could be said that the rule is a cause of, 
rather than a mere correlation to, the strength of the e-commerce market 
today.181 
With such a critical market hinging on the Court’s decision, one can 
understand the dissent’s unease with a decision that leaves e-commerce tax 
liability on unsteady ground.  Indeed, in the wake of Wayfair, remote retailers 
know that their lack of physical presence alone will not shield them from 
state sales tax liability.  However, while the physical presence “bright-line” 
was by no means clear-cut,182 it still offered more guidance than the 
substantial nexus analysis as it now stands.  By answering the question before 
it—whether physical presence should be required to establish substantial 
nexus for purposes of imposing sales tax on remote retailers—the Court in 
Wayfair raised so many more.  What, if not physical presence, are the metes 
and bounds of substantial nexus?  May states set a lower threshold than 
$100,000 in sales or 200 separate transactions into the state and still satisfy 
the requirement?  In fact, must states set a de minimis threshold in their sales 
tax legislation at all?  Further, to take a broader view of the issue, is it even 
necessary that states base their sales tax schemes on the economic 
involvement of retailers with the state, or is there some other metric by which 
substantial nexus may be established? 
Arguably, states looking to take a more well-settled path could 
simply copy South Dakota’s approach with S. 106 and would thereby also 
survive constitutional challenge.  However, even that route could not 
guaranty the validity of a state’s tax scheme, given the other potentially 
invalidating Commerce Clause principles that the Court did not discuss or 
resolve.183  Specifically, the Court identified the risk of discrimination against 
                                               
 180. In his dissent in Wayfair, Roberts avers that Congress, rather than the judiciary, 
should spearhead any changes to e-commerce taxation. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2101 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (“E-commerce has grown into a significant and vibrant part of our national 
economy against the backdrop of established rules, including the physical-presence rule. Any 
alteration to those rules with the potential to disrupt the development of such a critical segment 
of the economy should be undertaken by Congress. The Court should not act on this important 
question of current economic policy, solely to expiate a mistake it made over 50 years ago.”). 
 181. Id. at 2104 (“An erroneous decision from this Court may well have been an 
unintended factor contributing to the growth of e-commerce.”). 
 182. See Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 330–31 (White, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part), overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, 
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
 183. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
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interstate commerce, the potential for retroactive application, and unduly 
burdensome tax requirements as areas for concern moving forward.184 
As to the first, the risk of discrimination against interstate commerce, 
states must consider that South Dakota’s economic approach to substantial 
nexus is inherently more suited to a state with a destination-based tax 
system.185  In the destination-based system, taxes on goods that cross state 
lines are imposed at their ultimate destination—usually the purchaser, but not 
always, as is the case of import-for-export or sale-for-resale—because that is 
typically where the goods are consumed.186  This is generally thought to 
promote neutrality between intrastate and interstate commerce because it 
treats “all goods consumed in the state in the same way, regardless of the 
location from which they were shipped.”187  Accordingly, for states such as 
South Dakota that use a destination-based tax system,188 there is little cause 
for concern. 
However, to understand why the economic nexus approach needs a 
destination-based system, it helps to consider an example of a state with a 
different system.  In Tennessee, a taxable sale occurs upon “any transfer of 
title or possession, or both” for consideration.189  This is fine when the title 
and possession are transferred simultaneously.  On the other hand, imagine a 
scenario where an internet retailer in Tennessee makes a sale to a customer 
in a destination-tax state; imagine further that title transfers, as it often does, 
the moment the retailer places the good into transport with a common carrier.  
In this scenario, the retailer could theoretically be liable for Tennessee sales 
tax for the transfer of title and for the destination state’s sales tax for the 
transfer of possession. 
This risk of double-taxation obviously raises very serious Dormant 
Commerce Clause concerns, and under South Dakota’s approach in Wayfair, 
                                               
 184. These issues, the Court found, were not sufficient to “justify retaining [an] artificial, 
anachronistic rule” such as physical presence “that deprives States of vast revenues from major 
businesses.” Id. at 2099–100. 
 185. Charles E. McClure, Jr., Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Economic Objectives, 
Technological Constraints, and Tax Laws, 52 TAX L. REV. 269, 318 (1997) (“Tax policy 
considerations suggest that sales taxes should be imposed on a destination basis—that tax 
should be collected by the jurisdiction where consumption occurs, not where production 
occurs.”). 
 186. 2 JEROME HELLERSTEIN, WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAIN, STATE TAXATION 
¶ 18.02[1] (3d ed. 2012). 
 187. Id. 
 188. South Dakota considers the location a sale occurs to be the location where the 
ultimate consumer receives the product. SOUTH DAKOTA DEP’T OF REVENUE, SALES AND USE 
TAX GUIDE 3 (2018). 
 189. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-6-102(80)(A) (West 2018). Many other states share this 
definition of a taxable sale. However, differing interpretations of export and resale exemptions 
in those states keep the emphasis on the ultimate consumption of the good at its destination, 
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 186, at ¶18.02[2](a), which is less germane to this illustration. 
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both “taxable sales” could count toward a retailer’s nexus with each state.  
Accordingly, even if a state such as Tennessee mirrored South Dakota’s 
legislation, the nature of the rest of its tax structure could ultimately render 
its e-commerce taxation legislation invalid under the Commerce Clause. 
Next, the Court recognized retroactivity as a potential area of 
complication.190  In South Dakota’s case, S. 106 expressly prohibits 
retroactive application of its sales tax obligations.191  Accordingly, the issue 
of retroactivity was not before the Wayfair Court, and it was not definitively 
ruled upon.192  This leaves something of an open door for states following 
South Dakota’s lead; they may either create prospective legislation, as did 
South Dakota, or they may attempt to retroactively require remote retailers 
to collect and remit sales tax on items already sold.  Such a retroactive 
application could constitute double tax burden, where states have imposed 
use taxes upon the consumer of the good before Wayfair and may later seek 
to impose sales tax liability on the retailer for the same transaction.193  This 
could render invalid a state’s e-commerce taxation legislation, even if the 
state followed South Dakota’s rule and the Wayfair opinion in all other 
respects.194 
Finally, there is the risk of unduly burdening interstate commerce 
with the imposition of sales tax on remote retailers.195  The most notable 
burden, as it pertains to sales tax liabilities of remote retailers, is the 
administrative cost of compliance with differing tax schemes across 
multitudinous jurisdictions.196  Specifically, as the Quill Court noted, “a state 
tax might unduly burden interstate commerce” by subjecting retailers to the 
various and often dissimilar tax-collection obligations in thousands of 
different taxing jurisdictions.197  For example, the dissent in Wayfair 
discusses how “New Jersey knitters pay sales tax on yarn purchased for art 
projects, but not on yarn earmarked for sweaters,” and “Texas taxes sales of 
plain deodorant at 6.25 percent but imposes no tax on deodorant with 
antiperspirant.”198 
To further compound this complication, there were an estimated 
10,814 different tax jurisdictions across the United States in October 2017, 
                                               
 190. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
 191. Id. at 2089; see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-64-6 (2018) (“No obligation to remit 
the sales tax required by this chapter may be applied retroactively.”). 
 192. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
 193. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors and Economists in Support of Petitioner at 7 
n.5, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494), 2018 WL 1203458. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098. 
 196. Id. at 2104 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 197. Id. at 2093 (majority opinion) (quoting Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel. North Dakota 
, 504 U.S. 298, 313 n.6 (1992)). 
 198. Id. at 2103-04 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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and as many as 1,594 taxing jurisdictions in a single state.199  Remote retailers 
doing business in multiple states must contend not only with the different tax 
schemes of the different states, but also the different tax schemes across 
individual taxing jurisdictions within those states.  In his dissent, Chief 
Justice Roberts voiced concerns that this burden will not only negatively 
impact interstate commerce, but will fall disproportionately on small 
businesses, particularly those “that do not have established legal teams, 
software systems, or outside counsel to assist with compliance related 
questions.”200  Additionally, software that might help businesses comply with 
such diverse tax requirements across numerous jurisdictions is “still in its 
infancy” and thus may not mitigate the immense burdens of regulatory 
compliance for remote retailers.201 
The Court did not address these burdens in any great detail on 
account of South Dakota’s membership in the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax 
Agreement (“SSUTA”), which “affords small merchants a reasonable degree 
of protection.”202  As the Court recognized, the more than twenty states that 
are party to the SSUTA present fewer compliance challenges to remote 
retailers.203  The SSUTA requires a single, state-level tax administration, 
uniform definitions of products and services, simplified tax rate structures, 
and uniform destination-based sourcing for sales into a state from a remote 
retailer.204  This minimizes compliance costs within a particular state, which 
reduces the burden on retailers doing business with that state. 
However, as of the date of publication of this Article, only twenty-
three states are fully parties to the SSUTA.205  This means that the majority 
of states do not offer the same protection to remote retailers as does South 
Dakota, and the SSUTA does not act to alleviate compliance burdens for 
those states.  Consequently, even if a state that is not party to the SSUTA 
                                               
 199. April Loughead, Growing Number of State Sales Tax Jurisdictions Makes South 
Dakota v. Wayfair That Much More Imperative, TAX FOUND. (Apr. 17, 2018), 
https://taxfoundation.org/growing-number-state-sales-tax-jurisdictions-makes-south-dakota-
v-wayfair-much-imperative/. 
 200. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2104 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 201. Id. 
 202. See id. at 2098–99 (majority opinion). 
 203. Id. at 2099–100. 
 204. Id. 
 205. The full member states are Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board, State Info, 
https://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/index.php?page=state-info (last visited Aug. 10, 2018). 
Tennessee is an “associate” member, which means it has substantially, but not entirely, 
complied with the SSUTA requirements. Id. 
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replicates South Dakota’s e-commerce tax schemes, it may still run afoul of 
the Commerce Clause as unduly burdensome to interstate commerce. 
Owing to that area of uncertainty, as well as the others discussed 
above, Wayfair cannot be said to be the ultimate solution to the e-commerce 
taxation conundrum.  Perhaps, rather, it is only a single judicial step in what 
may be a multi-branch effort to both capitalize on the massive e-commerce 
revenue source and foster its continued growth in the years to come.  As both 
the majority and the dissent in Wayfair point out, Congress may legislate to 
address the many problems still facing e-commerce taxation.206  It may, in 
fact, be better suited to the task than the Court, given the capacity of Congress 
to “investigate and analyze facts beyond anything the Judiciary could match” 
and to “focus directly on current policy concerns rather than past legal 
mistakes.”207  However, until Congress takes the stage, if in fact it ever does, 
states must look to Wayfair to guide their sales and use tax schemes for 
remote retailers.  Accordingly, the next section analyzes states’ current 
approaches to taxing remote retailers through the lens of Wayfair to 
determine what works, what doesn’t, and what remains to be seen. 
IV. STATE APPROACHES TO TAXING E-COMMERCE REVENUE 
Even before Quill had taken its final bow on the remote retail 
taxation stage, many states took steps to prepare for—and even help bring 
about—its metaphorical curtain call.  In an effort to capitalize on e-commerce 
revenue, many states have been requiring remote internet retailers to collect 
and remit sales and use tax “they feel e-retailers owe to [them],” irrespective 
of the Quill impediments.208  States have employed a variety of methods to 
accomplish this aim, but three methods have emerged in recent years as the 
most prominent among the fifty states: economic nexus, affiliate (and click-
through) nexus, and reporting requirements.209  Each looks to a different 
                                               
 206. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098, 2101. However, Roberts has expressed concerns that 
the Wayfair decision may, in fact, impede Congress’ attempts to regulate in this area. Id. at 
2102–03 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Nothing in today’s decision precludes Congress from 
continuing to seek a legislative solution. But by suddenly changing the ground rules, the Court 
may have waylaid Congress’s consideration of the issue. Armed with today’s decision, state 
officials can be expected to redirect their attention from working with Congress on a national 
solution, to securing new tax revenue from remote retailers.”). 
 207. Id. at 2104. 
 208. Geoffrey E. Weyl, Quibbling with Quill: Are States Powerless in Enforcing Sales 
and Use Tax-Related Obligations on Out-of-State Retailers?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 253, 264 
(2012) (“[D]ue to declining revenue during the current economic recession, many states have 
sought to enact legislation that forces e-retailers to collect sales taxes. The states argue that 
they are being unreasonably deprived of revenue they are entitled to receive.”). 
 209. Remote Seller Nexus Chart, SALES TAX INST. (Oct. 5, 2018), http://www.salestaxin
stitute.com/resources/remote-seller-nexus-chart. 
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retail component to establish the state’s authority to tax a remote retailer, and 
each has its unique benefits and disadvantages with respect to e-commerce 
taxation, as well as unique implications under the new Wayfair precedent. 
A. Economic Nexus 
In a survey of all fifty states, economic nexus emerged as the modern 
trend in taxing remote internet retailers even before Wayfair approved South 
Dakota’s economic nexus-based tax scheme.210  Rather than placing the 
emphasis on a retailer’s physical presence within the state, the economic 
nexus approach looks to whether a taxable sale occurs within the state.211  
Stated another way, even if a retailer has no physical presence within the 
taxing state, if it makes taxable sales into the state, then that state may 
theoretically impose sales and use taxes on those sales.  The approach is 
predicated on the idea that “[t]axable activity should imply nexus.”212  It also 
conforms with International Shoe’s Due Process Principles, which provide 
that if an out-of-state seller “purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an 
economic market in the forum State,” Due Process is satisfied.213  Now that 
Wayfair has effectively made Due Process and the Commerce Clause 
analyses coterminous, the Commerce Clause is, by extension, also satisfied 
by such availment.  Essentially, by directing its economic activities into a 
state, a retailer makes reasonable the exercise of state authority. 
There are limits to the application of the economic nexus approach, 
however. Conventional wisdom on economic nexus taxation is that it should 
only be applied to retailers who surpass a certain de minimis “threshold” of 
sales in the state to avoid overburdening small businesses and businesses 
doing only negligible business in the taxing state.214  It also helps states avoid 
Due Process and Commerce Clause concerns by preventing them from taxing 
retailers who receive relatively little benefit from—and, therefore, have 
relatively little connection to—the taxing state, or overburdening smaller 
retailers with the regulatory costs of compliance.  This approach would seem 
                                               
 210. Other forms were more popular in earlier years. However, of the twenty-one states 
who have attempted to implement new e-commerce taxation schemes since 2015, over half 
have gone the way of economic nexus. Id. 
 211. Brian S. Masterson, Collecting Sales and Use Tax on Electronic Commerce: E-
Confusion or E-Collection, 79 N.C. L. REV. 203, 214–15 (2000). 
 212. Id. at 214 (quoting Charles E. McLure, Jr., Taxation of Electronic Commerce: 
Economic Objectives, Technological Constraints, and Tax Laws, 52 TAX L. REV. 269, 395 
(1997)). 
 213. Quill Corp. v. Heitkamp ex rel. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307 (1992) (citing 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)), overruled by South Dakota v. 
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
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to reflect a similar methodology to e-commerce taxation as the Marketplace 
Fairness Act of 2017.215 
States implementing the economic nexus system, such as South 
Dakota, follow a basic model: they seek to impose sales and use taxes on 
remote retailers whose in-state sales exceed the de minimis threshold in a 
calendar year. States, however, have differed in their individual de minimis 
thresholds for imposing those taxes.  Of the dozen or so states implementing 
the economic nexus system, most can be categorized as having one of two 
threshold requirements: (1) the lesser of $100,000 total in-state sales or 200 
separate transactions or (2) $500,000 total in-state sales.216  South Dakota’s 
tax scheme provides a prime example of the former, while Tennessee models 
the latter.217 
As discussed above, South Dakota’s S. 106 requires that remote 
retailers collect and remit sales tax on “tangible personal property, products 
transferred electronically, or services for delivery into South Dakota” if they 
satisfy one of two requirements in the previous or current calendar year: 
(1) The seller’s gross revenue from the sale of tangible 
personal property, any product transferred electronically, or 
services delivered into South Dakota exceeds one hundred 
thousand dollars; or 
(2) The seller sold tangible personal property, any product 
transferred electronically, or services for delivery into South 
Dakota in two hundred or more separate transactions.218 
This de minimis threshold also reflects the approach of a significant 
number of economic nexus states.219  For example, in late June of 2017, 
Maine passed an act requiring remote sellers to collect and remit sales and 
                                               
 215. The Marketplace Fairness Act of 2017 would allow states to collect sales and use 
taxes on sales done by non-small-seller remote retailers. The most notable distinction is that, 
where many economic nexus states base their de minimis threshold on the amount of sales 
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to taxability on annual gross receipts in total U.S. remote sales. See Marketplace Fairness Act 
of 2017, S. 976, 115th Cong. (2017). 
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 217. S.B. 106, 2016 Leg. Assemb., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016); Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 
1320-05-01-.129(2) (2017) [hereinafter “Rule 129”]. 
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2019] THE WAKE OF WAYFAIR 315 
 
use taxes on sales made into the state by retailers exceeding the $100,000 
sales or 200 transactions de minimis threshold.220 
Prior to Wayfair, a second category of economic nexus threshold was 
also making its way through the judicial system.  In January 2017, 
Tennessee’s Department of Revenue issued notice concerning its Rule 1320- 
05-01-.129(2) (“Rule 129”), which provides that remote retailers whose total 
sales to Tennessee customers in a 12-month period exceed $500,000 must 
collect sales tax for sales made in Tennessee.221  Tennessee is one of several 
states utilizing the $500,000 threshold for imposing sales and use tax on 
internet retailers.222  This regulation has also been challenged, not unlike the 
South Dakota regulation, though it did not make it to the Supreme Court. In 
March 2017, a lawsuit was filed in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, 
Tennessee, challenging the constitutionality of Rule 129.223  An agreed order 
was subsequently entered on April 10, 2017, preventing the enforcement of 
Rule 129 until a final judgment could be made on the case.224  The Tennessee 
General Assembly also passed legislation prohibiting the collection of any 
internet sales or use taxes authorized under 129 until the court’s ruling had 
been reviewed and approved by the General Assembly.225 
In light of Wayfair, it would seem that Rule 129 is likely to pass 
constitutional muster.  It tracks closely with South Dakota’s S. 106 in that it 
sets a sales threshold, but it is more generous with that threshold and does 
not offer the alternative of a number-of-transactions test.226  However, it is 
unclear whether the Tennessee General Assembly, upon review of Rule 129, 
will choose to reinstate the rule or explore alternative options.  The foregoing 
illustrates an interesting question for economic nexus states left open in the 
wake of Wayfair: how low can they go?  States like Tennessee, with a higher 
economic de minimis than South Dakota’s, might choose to lower their 
thresholds into line with South Dakota to capture more tax revenue.  They 
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might also attempt to go lower.  As discussed above, states using the 
economic nexus may even choose to forego a de minimis threshold 
altogether.  While it is true that the threshold limits potential constitutional 
challenges for unduly burdensome tax schemes, nothing in the Wayfair 
decision expressly requires states to set one.227  After Wayfair, states know 
that $100,000 in sales or 200 transactions is sufficient for nexus, but they 
cannot yet know if that threshold is required for nexus. 
Regardless, however, of the many unanswered questions still circling 
economic nexus tax schemes in light of Wayfair, it is clear from the foregoing 
analysis that many states believe the economic nexus approach is the most 
promising way to accomplish their e-commerce taxation goals.  The Wayfair 
decision only serves to bolster that conclusion.  In its wake, states will likely 
begin, those that have not already, implementing their own economic nexus-
based tax schemes to tap into the internet retail market. 
B. Affiliate and Click-Through Nexus 
Although not as contemporarily popular as its economic counterpart, 
the affiliate nexus approach gained significant traction in the late 2000s and 
early 2010s.228  To establish nexus, states using the affiliate nexus approach 
look to whether (1) an out-of-state retailer shares common ownership with 
an in-state retailer; and (2) the two entities operate a unitary business 
enterprise, generally for tax purposes.229  Stated another way, if an affiliate 
of a remote retailer can be subjected to sales and use tax in a state, then the 
remote retailer may also be subject to sales and use tax in that state. 
California’s Assembly Bill 155 (“A.B. 155”), passed on September 
9, 2011, is a prime example of how the system was implemented.230  Under 
A.B. 155, an out-of-state retailer is considered to have substantial nexus for 
sales and use tax purposes if it “is a member of a commonly controlled 
group . . . and is a member of a combined reporting group . . . that includes 
another member of the retailer’s commonly controlled group that” that 
performs services in the state on behalf of the out-of-state retailer.231  
Unfortunately, determining “affiliation” for purposes of nexus is an 
incredibly complex, multi-step process involving dueling principles of 
corporate formalities and economic realities,232 the full nature of which is 
                                               
 227. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
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beyond the scope of this note.  Lower courts across the board have also 
tended to reject this approach to remote retail taxation.233 
There is, however, an “offshoot” of affiliate nexus that avoids some 
of its problematic complexities while maintaining many of its practical 
effects: the click-through nexus approach.  With click-through nexus laws, 
also known as “referrer nexus,” a remote retailer can trigger sales and use tax 
liability by establishing business arrangements with an in-state entity that, 
for some sort of commission or consideration, refers potential customers to 
the remote retailer, typically through links on internet webpages.234  This 
nexus approach is often combined with some form of economic nexus de 
minimis threshold, though the threshold is usually lower than the ones 
discussed in the economic nexus analysis above.235  Again, after Wayfair, it 
is uncertain if a de minimis threshold is actually required. 
A number of states, including California,236 have explored this 
approach as a basis for imposing sales and use taxes on remote retailers.237  
Arguably, it requires fewer moving parts than its more Byzantine 
counterpart, affiliate nexus.  The analysis centers around a singular 
contractual arrangement, as opposed to ongoing business relationships, 
corporate structures, and even combined tax reporting eligibility.  However, 
as something of a trade-off for its more simplistic design, click-through 
application is inherently limited to the online solicitation of potential 
customers by in-state entities, while affiliate nexus could be more broadly 
applied. It also has not escaped the mire of judicial disapproval. 
For example, Illinois enacted a click-through nexus provision 
through its House Bill 3659 in 2011. H.B. 3659 provided that a remote 
retailer could trigger tax liability by “having a contract with a person located 
in [Illinois] under which the person, for a commission or other 
consideration . . . refer[red] potential customers to the retailer by a link on 
the person’s Internet website.”238  The provision was subsequently 
challenged, and in the 2013 case Performance Marketing Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Hamer, the Illinois Supreme Court found the provision to be void and 
unenforceable.239  Attempts to utilize both the affiliate and click-through 
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nexus approaches to taxing remote retailers have dwindled in recent years. 
However, following Wayfair’s abolition of the physical presence 
requirement, such approaches could see a resurgence. 
C. Notice and Reporting Requirements 
The preceding sections discussed states’ various attempts to 
implement economic and affiliate nexus systems.  Although there are 
significant differences between the two methods, they share at least one 
commonality: both are methods of directly imposing sales and use taxes on 
the remote retailers.  They seek to bring the retailer within the taxing 
authority of the state and, accordingly, have come into conflict with 
constitutional and statutory principles of what constitutes a taxable, 
substantial nexus. 
The notice and reporting requirements approach to collecting taxes 
from remote retail sales represents a fundamentally different way of 
accessing that revenue source.  This approach focuses not on the imposition 
of sales tax, but on the effective collection of use taxes.  A use tax is a tax 
imposed on the use of goods, rather than the purchase of goods, that are 
bought outside the taxing state.240  Accordingly, rather than attempting to 
directly tax sales by the remote retailer, notice and reporting requirement 
laws seek to tax use of out-of-state goods and services by in-state 
consumers.241  However, as the Court in Wayfair noted, “consumer 
compliance rates are notoriously low[.]”242 
To combat compliance issues, states using this approach often 
require retailers to notify consumers about their use tax obligations on 
purchases not subject to the states’ sales tax.243  Some states also require that 
remote retailers provide reports of all sales made into that state for which 
sales tax was not collected.244  Thus, “notice and reporting” requirements. In 
                                               
discriminatory tax on electronic commerce, which violated an independent provision of the 
federal Internet Tax Freedom Act. See Performance Mktg. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hamer, 998 N.E.2d 
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theory, this approach allows the states to access some of the revenue from 
remote retail sales without attempting to directly impose tax on remote 
retailers.  In the past, doing so allowed them to avoid the physical presence 
requirements set forth in Quill altogether. 
In practice, the application is not so neat.  Take, for example, the 
notice and reporting requirements that Colorado effectuated in 2010. 
Codified in Colorado Revised Statute Annotated § 39-21-112(3.5)(c)-(d), the 
requirements provide the following for sales to Colorado purchasers on 
which Colorado sales tax was not collected: (1) retailers must notify 
Colorado purchasers “that sales or use tax is due on certain purchases made 
from the retailer”; (2) retailers must notify Colorado purchasers “the total 
amount paid by the purchaser for Colorado purchases made from the retailer 
in the previous calendar year”; and (3) retailers must file annual statements 
for each purchaser, reporting the total amount of sales to those purchasers in 
the previous calendar year.245  Failure to provide the notice under (1) will 
subject the retailer to a five dollar penalty per failure, while failure to provide 
the report under (3) will subject the retailer to a ten dollar penalty per 
failure.246 
This provision of Colorado tax law was challenged in Direct 
Marketing Association v. Huber (“Huber”) on the grounds that the notice and 
reporting requirements discriminated against and imposed undue burdens on 
interstate commerce.247  The United States District Court for the District of 
Colorado agreed, citing Quill for the proposition that “a state law that 
imposes a use tax collection burden on a retailer with no physical presence 
in the state causes an undue burden on interstate commerce.”248  On appeal, 
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit thought 
otherwise, even while Quill was still considered good law.249  In Direct 
Marketing, the Tenth Circuit explained, “Quill applies narrowly to and has 
not been extended beyond tax collection.”250  And because the Court found 
the notice and report requirements to be separate from the collection and 
remission of taxes, it held that the Colorado law did not violate the 
Commerce Clause, nor did it conflict with the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Quill.251 
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The Direct Marketing line of cases draws attention to an issue of 
central importance to notice and reporting requirements: discrimination 
against interstate commerce.  The issue is more pronounced with this 
approach to taxation, as opposed to economic nexus and affiliate nexus, 
where the state seeks simply to impose the same sales tax on both in-state 
and out-of-state retailers.  Here, because the notice-report requirements focus 
primarily on use tax from retailers that do not collect sales tax—particularly 
in states where local retailers are obligated to pay sales tax, and are thus not 
subject to the requirements—the burdens would seem to fall more heavily on 
remote retailers.252  This was the district court’s primary basis for 
determining that the Colorado law violated the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.253  But, as the Tenth Circuit pointed out in overruling the district 
court’s decision, imposing the requirements served a more equifinal purpose: 
they effectively sought to put all businesses, in-state and out-of-state, on 
equal footing.254 
In theory, so long as a state can maintain this balance, its notice-
report requirements will not violate constitutional protections for interstate 
commerce.  States may endeavor to do so in a number of ways, such as 
compensating retailers for the cost of complying with the notice-reporting 
requirements,255 since many states already offer compensation for the cost of 
complying with sales and use tax collection requirements.256  States should 
also take steps to streamline the process for out-of-state retailers, and 
methods for doing so may include some of the following: making “form” 
notices readily available to out-of-state retailers, listing those purchases 
eligible for use tax exemptions,257 and for those states that collect a resident 
income tax, including a line on income tax returns on which residents report 
use tax dues.258 
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Colorado represents the successful maintenance of this precarious 
balance. Unfortunately, even the successful application of this approach may 
be subject to criticism given the “impracticability” of the collection of use 
taxes.259  States must rely on their residents to pay the use taxes owed on their 
purchases from remote retailers,260 and “consumers regularly fail to comply 
with lawful use taxes.”261  This shortfall may have contributed to the lost 
revenue reported by states under Bellas Hess and Quill.262  Accordingly, with 
the physical presence requirement laid to rest and greater options for sales 
tax imposition available, it is questionable how many states would choose to 
keep their sales and use tax income eggs squarely in the use tax basket. 
Of course, it is also important to note that the three approaches 
described above do not exist in a vacuum, and they are not mutually 
exclusive.  Although some states may choose to use purely economic nexus, 
purely affiliate nexus, or purely notice-report requirements in their respective 
taxation schemes for e-commerce sales, other states may choose to employ a 
combination of the various methodologies.263  Rhode Island’s House Bill 
5175, for example, utilizes all three approaches to collecting sales and use 
taxes from remote retailers.264 
Certainly, some approaches have been utilized more than have 
others, and some have seen more success in their utilization.  Additionally, 
there are different ways of implementing each approach that may yield 
different results.  With that in mind, the next section will offer a model 
provision, illustrating an approach that seeks to capture the most advantages 
for states’ tax schemes, while including the fewest practical and legal deficits.  
The benefits of each provision will be discussed as well. 
V. MODEL PROVISION FOR STATE E-COMMERCE TAXATION 
SCHEMES 
Between growing e-commerce sales, the modern decline of brick-
and-mortar retailers, and the overall importance of sales and use tax revenue 
to state funding schemes, states are highly motivated to find innovative ways 
to access the e-commerce market.  And with the fall of the physical presence 
requirement, new doors have opened for states’ sales and use tax schemes.  
The question then becomes how states should go about taxing remote retailers 
to both maximize benefits for all parties and avoid constitutional challenge. 
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As explained in earlier sections, the fall of Quill means the demise 
of the bright-line physical presence requirement for establishing substantial 
nexus.  It also means the beginning of a new question:  If not physical 
presence in the taxing state, what does constitute a substantial nexus for sales 
and use taxation purposes?  In the wake of Wayfair, the Supreme Court 
appears to have offered at least one potential answer to that question.  Given 
the Court’s approval of the economic nexus approach in South Dakota, as 
well as the rapid expansion of the economic nexus across the states, a seller’s 
economic contacts with the taxing state is likely the best approach to taxing 
e-commerce.265  Accordingly, a retailer’s sales tax liability in a certain state 
may be predicated on the amount of taxable sales it makes to consumers in 
that state. 
This approach also gained some strong footing in early academic 
discussions of the topic, and—when coupled with a de minimis exemption 
for small-sellers—is the approach that would seem to produce the most 
consistent, neutral impact on interstate commerce.266  It bases tax liability not 
on economically impractical measures like physical presence, or complex 
determinations of agency; rather, it centers wholly around the simple premise 
that taxable activity within a state—above a certain de minimis threshold—
creates tax liability in that state.267  In doing so, it calls for a fundamentally 
equivalent treatment of in-state retailers and out-of-state retailers: 
[A] person with physical presence in a state or that sells 
goods, whether tangible or intangible, or services for 
delivery in a state where they are subject to sales or use tax 
should be under the sales/use tax jurisdiction of that state, 
unless such sales to a particular state are de minimis. 
Similarly, a person that has a physical presence in the state 
or that conducts activities in a state that are factors in the 
formula the state uses to apportion income among the states 
(commonly payroll, property, and sales) should be subject to 
the income tax jurisdiction of that state, unless such 
activities in the state are de minimis.268 
While the balance is ultimately complicated by outside factors, it 
must be said that the economic nexus approach at least provides a strong 
starting point for a new, consistent understanding of substantial nexus. 
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To avoid “tipping the scales” in favor of in-state commerce, thus 
inviting constitutional challenges under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
states should consider a number of things.  The first is that the economic 
nexus approach is inherently more suited to a state with a destination-based 
tax system, as discussed in greater detail above.269  Accordingly, states like 
Tennessee whose sales tax is not necessarily determined by the destination 
or ultimate consumption of a good should consider adopting a destination-
based system, at least for purposes of e-commerce taxation.  Failure to do so 
may result in challenges under the Commerce Clause, as well as an increased 
burden for remote retailers. 
The second recommendation pertains to the de minimis threshold for 
imposing tax liability on remote retailers.  As a preliminary matter, while the 
Supreme Court has not expressly required a de minimis threshold, states 
should strongly consider implementing one in their own tax schemes.  This 
would help minimize the burden on smaller retailers and would also ensure 
that there are, in fact, substantial contacts with the state sufficient to create a 
taxable nexus. 
Once a state has decided to set a de minimis threshold, the question 
then becomes how the threshold should be calibrated.  States employing the 
economic nexus system have tended to base their de minimis threshold on the 
amount of sales into the state, rather than the retailer’s aggregate national 
sales.270  The former is a better method than the latter, notably because it 
prevents retailers from being subject to taxation in states where they do 
relatively little business; the state-sales model more closely reflects the 
actual, substantial nexus with the taxing state, which is now the standard 
under Wayfair.271  Higher de minimis amounts are less likely to face 
constitutional challenge on nexus grounds, but the Supreme Court has 
accepted a $100,000 sales or 200 separate transactions threshold, so that 
provides a strong starting point.272  Additionally, the Supreme Court did not 
approve that threshold as a minimum for substantial nexus, so the de minimis 
threshold could theoretically be lower.  In sum, the second recommendation 
for taxing remote retailers would be that the de minimis threshold be based 
on sales into the state, and be set at $100,000 in sales or 200 separate 
                                               
 269. See supra Section III.b (defining “destination-based tax system” and explaining the 
need for such a system under an economic nexus approach to e-commerce taxation). 
 270. The “amount” of sales can refer to either the number of separate transactions, or the 
total value of sales into the states. For example, Maine’s regulation would set the de minimis 
threshold at $100,000 total sales or 200 separate transactions. S.P. 483, 128th Leg., 1st Reg. 
Sess. (Me. 2017). Tennessee, on the other hand, sets its de minimis threshold purely at 
$500,000 total sales. Rule 129, supra note 217. 
 271. McClure, supra note 185, at 400. 
 272. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018). 
324 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:2: 284 
 
transactions,273 to avoid constitutional challenge and avoid unduly burdening 
small retailers with the high costs of compliance. 
Third, states should include language prohibiting the retroactive 
application of any internet retail taxation schemes they enact.  While it’s true 
that Wayfair did not expressly preclude retroactivity in e-commerce sales and 
use taxation, the Court recognized that the prospective nature of South 
Dakota’s S. 106 was a form of protection from undue burdens of taxation, 
particularly for small retailers.274  Furthermore, in addition to creating 
“massive exposure for retailers that never collected sales or use tax,” 
retroactive application would run afoul of significant reliance concerns.275  
Retailers, acting in “reasonable reliance on Quill and its predecessor, 
National Bellas Hess,” have not been collecting sales and use tax on sales 
made into states where those retailers do not have a physical presence.276  To 
retroactively make those retailers liable for sales and use tax on those sales 
would impose upon them a significant, unpredicted cost, as well as 
potentially impose double tax burdens for the same transaction.277  
Fortunately, in Wayfair, forty-one states joined to file an amicus curiae brief 
wherein they “provided assurances to the U.S. Supreme Court that retroactive 
application of any new decision would be unlikely and limited.”278  Even 
states that did not join should consider the relative merits of a prospective-
only application. 
Fourth and finally, a system of taxing remote retailers would benefit 
from uniformity across the states.279  This is especially true of e-commerce 
taxation because of the inherently borderless nature of the internet.  Sellers 
from Washington may be on the same webpage as sellers from Florida; 
purchasers from Hawaii may browse the same online stores as purchasers 
from New York.  There would seem to be something innately nonsensical 
about imposing different nexus requirements on such a ubiquitous form of 
retail.  That is not to say state tax rates would have to be similar280 or even 
that their apportionment methods would have to be the same across state 
lines.  By simply embracing the same economic nexus approach and de 
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minimis threshold, states could establish a more consistent marketplace for 
internet retailers and their customers.281  This uniformity is especially helpful 
for states that, unlike South Dakota, are not party to the SSUTA.  Given the 
costs and administrative challenges of collecting and remitting sales and use 
tax across more than 10,000 taxing jurisdictions across the 50 states, failure 
to find some common ground could deal a painful, if not fatal, blow to many 
internet retailers. 
The following is a model provision for the imposition of sales and 
use tax on remote internet retailers after Wayfair drafted by the Author with 
the foregoing four considerations in mind: 
Model: Sales and Use Tax Liability for Out-of-State 
Retailers 
(a) Out-of-state retailers will be deemed to have a 
substantial nexus with this State if they engage in regular or 
systematic solicitation of customers in this State through any 
means and either (i) made sales to consumers in this State 
from which gross revenue exceeds one hundred thousand 
dollars ($100,000) or (ii) completed two hundred (200) or 
more separate transactions for the delivery of tangible 
personal property, products transferred electronically, or 
services into this State during the previous or current twelve-
month period. 
(b) Out-of-state retailers having such substantial nexus 
with State as described in subsection (a) of this provision 
shall register with the State department of revenue for sales 
and use tax purposes and shall collect and remit the 
appropriate tax to the Department on sales of tangible 
personal property and other taxable items delivered to 
consumers in this State. 
(c) Persons who purchase tangible personal property or 
other taxable items from any out-of-state retailer as 
described in subsection (a) must pay State sales and use tax 
to the retailer, unless the sale is otherwise exempt under the 
laws of this State. 
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(d) No obligation to collect and remit the State sales tax 
required hereby may be applied retroactively. 
The individualized nature of states’ sales and use tax schemes makes 
it difficult to offer a singular method of implementing this change.  Some 
will require statutory changes; others may promulgate rules through the 
appropriate regulatory body.  The purpose of this model is only to serve as 
an illustration of how the economic nexus approach may be implemented in 
the future, with its de minimis threshold and new categorization of substantial 
nexus.  It may provide aid for states seeking to collect sales and use taxes on 
remote e-commerce without impeding interstate commerce, should Quill no 
longer control the field. 
CONCLUSION 
The retail landscape is changing.  With e-commerce on the rise, it is 
increasingly vital that states find ways to innovate and adapt their tax systems 
to the contemporary marketplace without hampering the growth of that 
marketplace.  Following Wayfair, and in the lingering silence of Congress, 
states will experience new freedoms in e-commerce taxation as the focus 
shifts from physical presence to other, perhaps yet unimagined means of 
establishing a substantial nexus.  There are now multitudinous options at their 
disposal by which to supplement their current revenue sources and adapt to 
the changing retail landscape. 
It bears mentioning that the ultimate wisdom of imposing sales and 
use taxes on e-commerce is tremendously complex and beyond the scope of 
this note.  Rather, this note is intended to address the impacts of Wayfair, 
including those stemming from issues it resolved as well as those it left 
unsettled, and to provide guidance for states looking to adapt their tax 
schemes to the current environment of e-commerce taxation.  As discussed 
above, such adaptations should strive to strike a balance between maximizing 
revenue and minimizing the burden upon remote retailers.  Failure to do so 
may irreparably harm the very marketplace states seek to gain advantage 
from.  Success, however, may serve to finally contemporize internet retail 
taxation with today’s commercial reality. 
 
